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direct investment in banking.I. MOTIVATION
Banking reform in transition economies has thus far been a gradual proc-
ess. Although most major reform elements have finally been implemented in a
number of countries, gradualism has caused inefficiencies and continued misal-
locations of resources in the years since the onset of reforms. Reform deficien-
cies are a result of both a misperception of the need for structural reforms in
banking and an overload of policy makers with other important reforms. Im-
provements in the efficiency of financial markets may in particular have been
sacrificed because direct and indirect barriers to the market entry of foreign
banks were erected. In order to shield the incumbent, undercapitalized domestic
banks from competition from abroad, licenses to foreign banks were typically
granted in a discretionary, piecemeal fashion. Although the more advanced re-
form states of Central Europe have certainly been more liberal in this regard
than some of their counterparts in the successor states of the former Soviet Un-
ion, reservations concerning the market entry of foreign financial institutions
have prevailed throughout the region. In addition to entry barriers for foreign
banks, capital flows have only gradually been liberalized, and capital exports
typically remain subject to a number of restrictions.
In view of their intention to join the European Union (EU) within the
foreseeable future, at least those states which have already signed Association
Agreements
1 will have to revise their current policies towards foreign banks
originating from EU countries. Such revisions will be necessary in order to
comply with the principles of home country control, mutual recognition, and
minimum harmonization that are enshrined in the Second Banking Directive of
the EU. In fact, most of these countries have already stated their intention to
assign a greater role to foreign banks during the privatization of domestic
banks, and to relax their licensing policies. It may thus appear that the present
paper is merely following the facts. Yet, there are many countries which have
thus far been fairly hostile to the market entry of foreign banks, and even in the
more advanced countries has the issue not yet been settled fully.
Against this background, this paper intends to serve three goals. First, it
will give the theoretical rationale for the argument that the market access of
1 These are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, the Baltic
countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Bulgaria, Romania, and recently also
Slovenia.foreign banks can be beneficial to transition economies (Part II). Second, it re-
views the current policies of four reform countries - the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, and Poland - vis-a-vis foreign banks and with regard to capital
account transactions, and it contrasts these regulations to the rules applying in
the EU (Part III). Third, the empirical evidence on the activities of foreign
banks in transition economies is presented (Part IV). Part V concludes.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The optimal sequence of internal and external financial liberalization has
been widely discussed in the context of reforms in developing countries
(Cho/Khatkhate, 1989; Gelb/Sagari, 1990; Mathieson, 1980; Reisen/Fischer,
1993). In contrast to these economies, internal financial liberalization in transi-
tion economies implies, first of all, to abolish the monobank and to replace it by
a two-tier banking system. In addition, financial liberalization denotes the lift-
ing of administrative controls on the activities of commercial banks, i.e., the
abolition of interest rate and credit controls as well as the termination of subsi-
dized lending programs. External financial liberalization is defined as the
opening of the capital account for both capital imports and exports. It includes
the abolition of foreign exchange controls, of restrictions on the activities of
domestic and foreign banks, and of restrictions to borrowing from and to de-
positing abroad. ^
With regard to the optimal sequence of financial liberalization, most
authors suggest that the capital account of the balance of payments should only
be liberalized after the domestic financial system has been deregulated, and that
the opening of markets for foreign competition in financial services should pro-
ceed only gradually. In fact, just as foreign direct investment (FDI) in the nonfi-
nancial sector can be immiserizing if domestic prices are distorted
(Edwards/van Wijnbergen, 1987), FDI in banking may be detrimental to eco-
nomic growth if the domestic banking system is highly regulated or even finan-
cially repressed? And even if domestic financial markets have been liberalized
formally, inherited institutional structures will de facto determine the structure
of a financial system for a certain amount of time. Only a few authors perceive
the benefits of capital account liberalization to outweigh its costs. Lai (1987),
for example, proposes to liberalize the capital account in parallel to the removal
of restrictions on the trade in goods in order to remove distortions in the do-
mestic financial markets. Similarly, Walter (1985) favors the national treatmentin trade with financial services because [tjhere is not greater justification for
protection (appropriately defined) in financial services than in steel, automo-
biles or telecommunications equipment (p. 117).
In discussing the optimal sequence between internal and external finan-
cial liberalization, this paper will mainly focus on the market access of foreign
banks and thus on FDI in banking. Obviously, competitive pressure on domestic
financial institutions can also come through various items of the capital account.
Borrowing of domestic firms and households from abroad and the possibility to
hold financial wealth in deposits abroad link domestic and foreign interest rates.
Due to transactions costs involved in cross-border financial flows, however,
competitive pressure is relatively indirect if only the capital account has been
liberalized.
This section starts by framing the argument for internal-before-external
financial liberalization in a simple model of the banking firm. Yet, the simple
static framework leaves important dynamic aspects out of consideration. It is
thus also shown that the market entry of foreign banks can be beneficial to the
economy as a whole because the efficiency of the banking system is enhanced,
because technology and know-how in banking are improved, and because firms
and banks can access the international capital market. In addition, bankruptcies
of domestic financial institutions are not inevitably a by-product of liberaliza-
tion if domestic banks can exploit their comparative advantages in the provision
of financial services.
/. Non-Performing Loans and Market Entry
Domestic banks in transition economies have to struggle with a vast array
of operational inefficiencies and with low-quality assets. The banks have inher-
ited non-performing loans from the former regime of central planning, and they
lack both experienced personnel and reliable sources of information on enter-
prise performance needed to perform a reliable credit assessment. Many banks
have therefore granted substantial amounts of non-performing loans even in the
post-reform period. While cross-country comparisons of the scale of non-
performing loans are complicated by different accounting standards, loan write-
off regulations, provisioning requirements, and the actual level of reserves, a
gradual downward trend of classified loans as a percentage of the total loan
portfolio of commercial banks can be observed. Still, non-performing loans intransition economies are generally higher than in developed market economies.
In mid-1995, Hungarian banks reported 19.9 percent of their loans as being
classified. At the end of 1995, Polish commercial banks had 21.7 percent of
their loans classified as overdue, and this share reached even 35.4 percent in the
Czech Republic in May 1996. Only Estonian banks have been able to hold
classified loans at a level of 2.9 percent (April 1996) which is exceptionally low
compared to other transition economies.
 2 Note, however, that substantial
amounts of non-performing loans had been written off after the Estonia banking
crisis of 1992/93.
In the presence of non-performing assets, banks are in the need to earn
sufficiently high interest rate spreads on the profitable part of their operations in
order to offset past losses and to maintain their operations (Buch, 1996). This
mechanism is the main rationale behind suggestions to postpone external fi-
nancial liberalization until internal financial liberalization has taken place, and
until domestic banks have recapitalized themselves through current profits.
This argument can be made more clear in a simple formal model in which
bank i competes in a market with n other banks. I consider a situation in which
the domestic banking sector has been liberalized already, i.e., banks can deter-
mine their interest rates and the volume of their activities. The fact that the fi-
nancial system has formerly been repressed is captured through a variable
which represents the stock of bad debt that a bank carries forward as a loss from
the previous period (s, =-nii_, >o).3 Generally, a bank carries a loss forward if,
in the previous period, the bank's lending activities yielded a return which was
insufficient to cover costs, and if the equity base was too small to absorb these
losses. Such constellation is, of course, only conceivable if the institutional
framework allows the bank to stay in business despite its negative equity. The
government could, for example, temporarily guarantee the liabilities of the
banks, and the legal declaration of insolvency can be postponed. Because such a
deferment of liabilities cannot continue permanently, the banks must realize a
non-negative profit in the present period.
2 These data were taken from CNBb (May 1996), Eesti Pank b (No. 3, 1996),
MoF/ NBH (1995), and Olechowska (1996).
3 See Buch (1996) for a detailed description of this variable. Modeling the
stock of bad debt as assets which carry an interest rate which has been fixed
below the market interest rate instead would not change the qualitative nature
of the results.7
Banks invest their deposits (D) into loans (L) only. Under Cournot-type
competition, bank i maximizes its profit (r^) under the assumption that the loan
supply and the deposit demand of all other banks j are given
4
(1) TliiLi,
where i ^ j; i, j = l,...,n. The bank receives a return on lending (r
1) which is
identical to the market rate of interest. The bank's costs consist of the interest
payments on its deposits (r
D) and on operating costs (K(). The loss which has
been carried forward from the previous period enters the profit equation as a
fixed cost.
5 Without changing the qualitative results of the analysis, the deposit
rate will be considered as exogenous to the banks (r
D =f
D). Because banks hold





The bank thus maximizes its profit by determining the optimal supply of loans,
as given by the first order conditions for a profit maximum
Assuming that all banks are identical, aggregating (2) over all n banking firms,
and solving for r
L reveals that the oligopoly price for loans is set at a margin
above marginal costs. The size of this margin depends upon the interest rate
elasticity of loan demand e(L,r
L) and on the number of competitors. This gives a
modified version of the Amoroso-Robinson pricing rule
4 The basic model has been taken from Baltensperger and Milde (1987). For
simplicity, Dj and Lj is used as a shorthand for ^Djand ^TLJ . See Selten
(1980) for a general description of the oligopolistic market structure.
5 Operating costs are increasing in D and L (KD,K, >0).The second order
conditions for a profit maximum are derived in Buch (1996).K +r
D 1
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As the number of the competitors rises, the equilibrium loan rate converges to
the bank's marginal costs.
6 The market entry of new banks therefore puts pres-
sure on interest rate spreads. Allowing for an impact of the number competitors
also on the deposit rate, this effect would be positive, i.e., the deposit rate would
tend to rise in response to an increase in n. Competition may thus drive the ex-
pected return from lending below total average costs. This gives an explanation
for the reluctance of the regulatory authorities to let new banks enter the market
if the incumbent banks have a stock of bad debt on their balance sheet. Because
new domestic or foreign banks do not have to cover past losses out of current
profits, market entry would threaten the viability of the incumbent banks.
The main concern against the market entry of foreign banks stems from
the fact that they not only have a balance sheet which is clear from non-
performing loans but that they also have lower operating costs than domestic
banks. Hence, their presence in the market may be even more detrimental to the
incumbent banks than the emergence of new domestic financial institutions.
The effects of different cost structures can more explicitly be shown in a
duopoly-model (n = 2). Assuming a linear market demand for loans, the equi-
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By using (4), the first order condition for a profit maximum of bank 1 becomes
6 These result have been derived under the assumption dKL = 0. By using the
implicit functional form F(r',n) = o and the rule — = - " <o (Chiang,
1984, p. 208), it can be shown that relaxing this assumption would not
change the qualitative results of the analysis./-/^j\
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The optimal loan supply and deposit demand of each bank are determined by
the intersection of the reaction functions in (5)
(5')
Loan supply of bank 1 thus expands if the marginal costs of bank 2 rise and de-
creases if its own costs increase, albeit with different intensities (and vice
versa). Changes in the relative cost structures of the banks thus affect market
shares. The market share of bank 1 on the loan market (MS,), for example, de-
creases if its marginal operating costs increase relative to that of its competitor
(6) 1 L L,+L2
The effect of an increase (decrease) in marginal costs relative to the bank's com-
petitor is therefore a loss (gain) in market share and in profits. The market entry
of foreign banks thus tends to force existing banks out of the market, and it hin-
ders the market entry of new domestic banks.
2. Welfare Implications of Foreign Banking
The main argument against an early market entry of foreign banks is the
risk that domestic financial institutions cannot withstand increased competitive
pressure and would go bankrupt. In addition to bank bankruptcies during which
(uninsured) depositors would lose their savings, banking failures might have10
spill-over effects on other banks, and information capital would be destroyed.
7
Hence, a government which assigns a high weight to domestic banks' profits
would decide to postpone external financial liberalization until the efficiency of
domestic banking has improved.
Yet, the welfare costs of the market entry of foreign banks must be
weighted against the welfare gains which arise from a more liberal regime.
Generally, the case for international trade in financial services can be made in
an analogy to international trade in goods. Because the production of financial
services is rather human capital intensive, countries which have a relative rich
supply of skilled labor are likely to export financial services. Employing the
principle of national treatment implies free trade in financial services and allows
countries to exploit their comparative advantages in the production of these
services. The analogy between trade in goods and in financial services is not
complete, however. While trade in goods and factor movements can be viewed
as close substitutes, the provision of financial services abroad is quite tightly
linked to the actual presence of the financial intermediary in the foreign country
(Walter, 1985). Because the provision of financial services is largely based on
informational advantages that an intermediary has, personal contacts to custom-
ers are needed. Even though the need for a bank to be physically present in the
market abroad diminishes as new communication technologies are developed,
entry restrictions for foreign financial institutions remain quite effective in pro-
tecting the domestic financial sector from foreign competition. Capital account
liberalization and FDI in banking are thus imperfect substitutes.
A number of factors have been discussed in the literature which deter-
mine comparative advantages of international financial institutions
(Goldberg/Johnson, 1990; Grubel, 1977; Walter, 1985). Because one main rea-
son for the existence of banks is their ability to process information more effi-
ciently than other institutions, experience, prior customer relations, and human
resource endowments are driving forces behind the international expansion of
banks. In addition, the regulatory environment of a host country, and - to a
lesser extent - diversification effects of international investments are important
determinants of FDI in banking. The importance of existing customer relations
implies that trade in goods and FDI in banking may be complements. The di-
7 In addition, the fear of foreign control in the banking industry and the even-
tual loss of monetary control can be voiced against the market entry of
foreign banks. See Grubel (1977) and Wachtel (1995) for an overview.11
rection of causality is thus not clear. While banks may merely be following their
customers into foreign countries, they may as well be present in foreign markets
prior to their corporate clients and provide information about the new market.
Analyzing historical data, Kindleberger (1983) finds no convincing evidence for
the hypothesis that banks merely follow their clients. Accordingly, the presence
of foreign banks can be one determinant of the attractiveness of a host country
for FDI in the nonfinancial sector.
Studies on the international activities of US banks shed some light on the
empirical relevance of different determinants of FDI in banking. Goldberg and
Johnson (1990) explain the total assets of foreign bank branches and the total
number of branches, respectively, by various independent variables. They show
that FDI in banking is positively related to a favorable regulatory regime to-
wards foreign banks, and to the size of the host country's population as a proxy
for the volume of business. The foreign activities of domestic nonfinancial
firms are measured by the volume of FDI in the nonfinancial sector. It turns out
that large banks are more prone to follow their clients than smaller banks. The
importance of FDI by nonfinancial firms in the host country for FDI in banking
is more clearly borne out in a study by Sagari (1992). She analyzes the determi-
nants of FDI of banks from the United States in 21 developed and developing
countries in the year 1977. The only variable which has a clearly significant,
positive impact on banks' international expansion is the investment of US-firms
in the host country's non-banking industry. Favorable regulations and the host
country's market size positively affect FDI in banking, albeit at a lower signifi-
cance level, while a clear link to the competitiveness of the domestic banking
industry could not be established. Sagari concludes that foreign banks have the
potential to break up an oligopolistic domestic market structure, but that their
impact on competition is limited by their focus on relatively small market
niches.
Viewing FDI in banking as reflecting comparative advantage reveals a
major shortcoming of the above model which does not allow for a differentia-
tion between banking products. Because only one class of loans is produced,
absolute cost advantages matter. In reality, however, banking products are much
more diverse. Even though domestic banks may have higher operating costs and
provisioning needs in absolute terms as compared to foreign banks, they may
yet be able to exploit comparative advantages in the provision of some financial
services. Even if unrestricted market access of foreign banks is possible, these
banks may choose not to enter into the traditional business of domestic banks12
but rather to restrict themselves to relatively small market segments. Export
trade financing, investment banking, and some areas of wholesale banking are
the fields where foreign banks are most likely to be active.
Apart from the utilization of comparative advantages in producing finan-
cial services, FDI in banking can also contribute to a transfer of know-how into
the domestic banking system and in improving its efficiency. This can directly
be achieved through the acquisition of ownership stakes or through the forming
of twinning arrangements with domestic banks. These links could actually assist
the domestic banks in better utilizing their information capital and provide the
users of financial services with superior inputs. Hence, substantial gains from
higher quality intermediation can be realized. In addition, foreign banks can im-
prove the corporate governance of domestic banks if they acquire stakes in the
privatized banks.
An argument which is often voiced against the market entry of foreign
banks is the fear that foreign banks pick only the ,,best" clients, leaving the do-
mestic banking sector with a pool of low-return, high-risk enterprises. Yet, this
argument does not justify to shield the transition economies from competition in
financial services for two reasons.
First, ex ante and ex post knowledge about the quality of loan customers
must be distinguished. Ex ante asymmetries in information are one main ra-
tionale for the existence of financial intermediaries in general and of banks in
particular. Because the quality of prospective borrowers can typically not be as-
sessed with certainty prior to the writing of a loan contract, screening and sort-
ing mechanisms need to be designed which help to overcome informational
asymmetries. The fact that foreign banks tend to operate with clients which ex
post are revealed to have an above average profitability simply implies that
these banks have developed better risk assessment techniques than the domestic
banks. These abilities cannot be utilized if markets are protected, and credit ra-
tioning may result (Stiglitz/Weiss, 1981).
Second, the fact that foreign banks in many cases merely follow their cli-
ents abroad and thus expand their home country business suggests that this type
of business may not be available to the domestic banks. Foreign banks make use
of the specific customer relationship that they have build up which cannot easily
be replicated by a domestic bank. The relevant alternative to the presence of4m Instituts fur WeStwirischdn*
foreign banks abroad may thus be that they service their customers through the
foreign bank's home country headquarters.
In summary, most arguments against the market entry of foreign banks
are based on a partial equilibrium model which fails to take account of positive
welfare effects of FDI in banking. Postponing external financial liberalization
shields domestic banks which have not yet been recapitalized from the loss of
market shares and prevents information capital from being destroyed. If the
problem of inherited non-performing assets has been dealt with through the re-
capitalization of banks, however, the case for a protectionist regime vis-a-vis
foreign banks is substantially weakened. Hence, postponing the market entry of
foreign banks in the presence of bad loans is likely to be the wrong strategies
for the transition economies. A superior strategy would be to relieve domestic
banks from their burden of inherited bad loans early on through recapitaliza-
tion.
8
Dealing with non-performing loans, however, is less straightforward than
the simple theoretical analysis implies. While banks can be recapitalized for
their stock of inherited bad loans, the volume of new bad loans is - by defini-
tion - endogenous to the structure of a country's banking system. In order to
arrive at a comprehensive solution, incentive and control structures of banks
must be substantially modified in order to prevent new bad loans from emerg-
ing. This is in fact the most complicated task. When determining the optimal
sequence of reforms, policy makers must be aware of the fact that foreign banks
can play an important role in the needed privatization of domestic banks, in im-
proving corporate governance mechanisms for banks, and in creating a com-
petitive climate which is conducive to enhanced efficiency in banking.
Of course, this sequence can not always be obeyed because recapitalization
may have been procrastinated already. Buch (1996) discusses options how to
deal with bad debt in such cases.14
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal framework for the activities of foreign banks in the countries
under review is currently shaped by the banking laws and foreign exchange
regulations that have been adopted since the onset of reforms. In addition, the
regulations of the EU for association and accession to the Union constrain the
legislative choices of the transition economies. Notwithstanding the still in-
complete market access in the area of financial services, the transition econo-
mies have already made substantial progress in comparison to the pre-reform
period. In 1979, for example, former Czechoslovakia was virtually closed for
foreign banks, allowing not even representative office to be established. Poland
and the former Soviet Union restricted foreign banking to representative offices.
Hungary had the most liberal regimes towards foreign banks. It only prohibited
foreign bank branches and foreign investment in domestic banks while gener-
ally allowing subsidiaries of foreign banks to be opened (Walter, 1985, pp. 54).
1. Direct Investment in Banking
9
All the countries under review have in principal lifted the barriers to the
market entry of new domestic and foreign banks with the establishment of two-
tier banking systems at the beginning of the reform process. Yet, FDI in bank-
ing has not yet been fully liberalized, foreign banks can in principle be treated
differently from domestic banks, and both domestic and foreign banks have at
times been affected by moratoria on new banking licenses.
Generally, foreign bank representation can take a number of institutional
forms which have a different impact on the competitive position and on the ac-
tivities of the foreign banks (Biischgen, 1991; Heinkel/Levi, 1992). Represen-
tative offices of foreign banks do not perform independent banking activities,
they rather attract and arrange business for their parent company abroad. Often,
representative offices of foreign banks also negotiate correspondent relation-
ships with domestic banks. In contrast to representative offices, branches of
foreign banks engage in regular banking activities but are not legally independ-
ent from their headquarters. Accordingly, decision making is not fully delegated
to the foreign branch, and the activities of branches are backed by the capital of
9 This section is based on Eesti Pank (1994), von Furstenberg/Hofer (1996),
Kostro (1992), and SBS (1994b).15
the mother company. Foreign bank branches are subject to the banking super-
vision of both the home and the host country. Subsidiaries of foreign banks, fi-
nally, are legally independent from their parent company and must back their
activities by their own capital. Hence, foreign banks need to invest more capital
abroad if they want to facilitate the same level of lending activity through a
subsidiary rather than a branch.
In the Czech Republic, foreign banks have been allowed to establish sub-
sidiaries and to buy stakes in domestic banks since 1990. However, branches
can only be opened since the beginning of 1992. A permission of the Czech
National Bank is needed for the acquisition of a domestic banks (CNB, 1995).
Yet, after the Czech banking sector experienced instabilities during late 1993
and in the first months of 1994, the issuance of new licenses for domestic as
well as for foreign banks was stopped in mid-1994. Even during this period,
foreign banks could acquire stakes in existing domestic banks. Reportedly,
however, demand has been fairly low. The Czech National Bank has generally
stated that it prefers foreign or domestic capital to enter existing banks rather
than grant new licenses (CNBa, 12/1994). As of March 1996, 8-9 requests for
licenses of foreign banks were pending, two of which were granted in May
1996. Future market access of foreign banks will likely remain regulated with 1-
2 licenses per year to be granted (NZZ, 1996).
Also in Poland, the National Bank prefers to limit the market entry of
foreign banks to participation in the privatization of Polish banks and in trou-
bled domestic banks. Cooperation in the banking sector has also been promoted
through twinning agreements between domestic and foreign banks. In 1993,
Poland implemented a program which intended to solve the problem of inher-
ited bad loans and to promote enterprise restructuring (Pawlowicz, 1995). Un-
der the program, the nine regional commercial banks which had been carved out
of the monobank in 1989 had to found loan work-out departments. At the same
time, the banks were recapitalized for parts of their bad loan portfolios. With the
technical assistance of foreign partner banks, the work-out departments had to
develop and to implement restructuring strategies for their corporate clients.
Reportedly, these twinning agreements have been fairly successful in improving
banking skills. Ownership involvement of the foreign partners in the domestic
banks, however, could not be promoted quite as much as had been envisaged.
Generally, foreign banking activities in Poland can take the form of the
purchase of equity in an existing institution, the establishment of a new bank,16
the establishment of a branch, or of a representative office. If a foreign bank
wants to establish a branch or a new bank in Poland, approval of the President
of the National Bank after consultation with the Ministry of Finance is required
(von Furstenberg/Hofer, 1996; Bury et al., 1995). The nomination of the chief
executive officer of the bank also requires consultation with the National Bank,
and the minimum capital of the foreign bank must be ECU 5 million. Upon
granting a license, the maximum amount of profits which can be repatriated
without an exchange permit is determined. Founding a representative office,
which activities are restricted to advisory functions, requires a permit from the
president of the National Bank. Licensing has been quite liberal between 1990
and 1992. Foreign banks initially even enjoyed tax advantages during the first
years of their operations, and they could keep part of their capital in foreign cur-
rency (Wachtel, 1995). Between early 1992 and late 1994, however, the market
entry for foreign banks has been restricted. Despite several applications pend-
ing, no new licenses to foreign banks were issued by the Polish National Bank
during this time (PlanEcon, 1995).
In Hungary, the market entry of foreign banks has been liberalized in
1987. An approval of the government is needed if foreigners wish to open a
fully or partially foreign-owned bank, or if they wish to acquire stakes in an ex-
isting domestic bank (SBS, 1994b). No approval is needed if these stakes are
less than 10 percent of the capital of the domestic bank. The approval of a li-
cense application depends on a number of quantitative and qualitative factors.
Apart from meeting minimum capital requirements and having met certain per-
formance criteria in the past 5 years, the business reputation of its founder(s),
the familiarity of the founder with the Hungarian banking community, the im-
pact of the foreign bank on the competitive situation of the Hungarian banking
sector, and the treatment of Hungarian banks in the foreign bank's home coun-
try are considered during the licensing procedure. Licensing requests are dealt
with by the State Banking Supervision, which in the case of Hungary is organ-
ized as an independent state agency, upon consultation with the Hungarian Na-
tional Bank.
Estonia is the only country in the sample which in its banking law ex-
plicitly assigns a role to the cooperation with foreign banking supervisors (Eesti
Pank, 1994). If a foreign bank wants to establish a subsidiary or branch in Es-
tonia, it must submit an application containing information about the bank to
the Bank of Estonia through its home country banking supervision. This appli-
cation must be supplemented by a statement of the home country's banking su-17
pervision concerning the bank's capital, liquidity, and access to a deposit insur-
ance scheme. Based on this information, the Bank of Estonia issues licenses to
foreign banks. In a similar vein, the Bank of Estonia forwards information on an
Estonian bank which wishes to establish a branch abroad to the host country's
banking supervision. The Bank of Estonia may also refuse the permission to go
abroad. Estonian and foreign banks have been equally affected by a moratorium
on banking licenses which had been put into place after the banking crisis of
1992 between April 1993 and the beginning of 1994.
2. Capital Account Liberalization
In contrast to fairly broad efforts to establish current account convertibil-
ity, capital account convertibility remains restricted in all countries with the ex-
ception of Estonia. Here, full capital account convertibility was achieved in
May 1994 when natural persons were allowed to open new foreign currency ac-
counts within the country (Lainela, 1994). Capital account liberalization in the
three Visegrad countries has followed an asymmetric pattern. While capital in-
flows, in particular those related to FDI, were substantially liberalized, a num-
ber of restrictions on capital outflows are being maintained.
Recently, the three Visegrad countries have revised their foreign ex-
change regulations in preparation of their OECD membership. The new Czech
Foreign Exchange Law which was passed in September 1995, further liberalizes
capital inflows but retains restrictions on capital outflows, in particular on
short-term flows (CNB, 1995). The law distinguishes between activities which
are free but must be reported, which need a permission of the Czech National
Bank, and which are prohibited. A permission of the National Bank is needed
for granting loans to abroad, for portfolio investment abroad, and for deposits
abroad. Foreign direct investment abroad - defined as investments exceeding 10
percent of the share capital of one company - does not require a permission but
must be reported. Similarly, loans from abroad, the issuance of bonds abroad,
and the purchase of real estate must be reported. Only the purchase of real estate
in the Czech Republic by foreigners is prohibited.
The new Hungarian Foreign Exchange Act took effect in January 1996
(MOF/NBH, 1995; NBH, 1995). Both financial investments of residents outside
Hungary and of non-residents inside Hungary require licensing. Hereby, the
dividing line between financial investment and FDI is drawn at 10 percent of18
the firm's capital. Raising long-term financial funds with a maturity of more
than one year abroad does not require a permission but must be reported.
In Poland, new foreign exchange legislation came into effect in April
1996 (Handelsblatt, 1996). Capital flows linked to FDI are now generally lib-
eralized, and Poles can invest into shares abroad if they acquire a stake in the
company exceeding 10 percent of its capital. Other long-term financial transfers
such as loans to abroad have been liberalized as well, while a further liberaliza-
tion of short-term portfolio capital flows is envisaged for early 1997.
Because of restrictions on direct borrowing from abroad and because of
the transaction costs involved when tapping a foreign loan market, borrowing
from abroad has thus far been of minor importance for the financing of firms in
transition economies. According to unpublished data of the Hungarian National
Bank and of the Czech National Bank (Olsovsky, 1995), loans from abroad
amounted to US-$ 665.4 million in Hungary in 1995 and to US-$ 1.550 million
in the Czech Republic in 1994.10 Compared to 1993 (Czech Republic: 1991)
the volume of loans from abroad has multiplied by a factor of 2.7 (6.5). Never-
theless, new foreign loans have been insignificant, amounting to less than 1 per-
cent of the total increase in domestic credit to firms.
3. Association and Accession to the European Union
In December 1991, the Visegrad countries have signed Europe Agree-
ments with the EU which are intended to promote the countries' access to the
Union. Estonia's Europe Agreement, which has not yet been ratified by the Es-
tonian parliament, was signed in mid-1995. The Europe Agreements include the
following provisions concerning the financial sector and the capital account:
1!
1. The market entry of foreign banks is liberalized asymmetrically. The reform
states can maintain restrictions to the market entry of foreign banks until the
end of a ten-year transition period, i.e., until the year 2001. After five years,
hence starting in 1997, remaining entry restrictions need to be phased out
gradually. Restrictions to the market entry of foreign banks can generally be
maintained for reasons of improved monetary control and prudential super-
1
0 Partly, these difference can be attributed to the fact that in the case of Hun-
gary only guaranteed loans are included.
11 See EU (1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995b) and Kuschel (1992).19
vision of the banking system. The members of the EU, in contrast, are not
allowed to treat banks from the reform states any different than banks from
other EU states. Due to a lack of harmonization of banking regulat
;ons, how-
ever, this regulation has little practical relevance for the access of banks from
the reform states to Western markets.
2. While the convertibility of the currencies for current account transactions and
for FDI in the nonfinancial sector is ensured, capital account transactions and
FDI in banking can be more tightly regulated. During the first phase of the
ten-year association period, the preconditions for the full adoption of EU
regulations concerning the free flow of capital must be created, during the
second phase, the need for the maintenance of restrictions on the capital ac-
count will be assessed. Estonia has - in contrast to the Europe Agreements of
the Visegrad-countries - already liberalized its capital account vis-a-vis the
EU for portfolio capital flows and for foreign bank credits.
3. The EU provides technical and financial assistance to the reform states in or-
der to improve the accounting systems, the legal framework for the opera-
tions of financial markets, and the information systems.
In addition to the Europe Agreements, the EU has outlined the prerequi-
sites for accession to the Union in its White Book of 1995 (EU, 1995a).
1
2 Fu-
ture members of the EU must accept the entire acquis communautaire and the
regulations of the internal market. This implies, among others, the acceptance of
the principles of mutual recognition of banking licenses, of minimum harmoni-
zation, and of home country control which are enshrined in the Second Banking
Directive of the EU of 1993.
1
3 In addition, the capital account must be liberal-
ized also for short-term capital flows, and restrictions can be maintained only in
exceptional cases. Since capital account restrictions can also temporarily be
maintained in the member states of the EU, however, the transition economies
will presumably have some bargaining power in this area.
1
2 Apart from the EU regulations, the statutes of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the
Uruguay Round deal with the liberalization of capital flows (UNCTAD,
1994a, 1994b). However, the regulations of the EU concerning the internal
market impose the most stringent requirements on the reform countries. Arti-
cles VIII and XIV of the IMF, for example, only deal with current account
and limited capital account convertibility.
13 See Tirole (1995) for a discussion of the question whether the banking regu-
lations of the EU would suit the needs of the transition economies.20
IV. FOREIGN BANKING IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
1. Determinants of FDI in Banking
Important determinants of FDI in banking are the size and the growth
potential of the foreign market, and the representation of foreign nonfinancial
firms on that market. For the purpose of this paper, (future) market size is
proxied by per capita GDP, population size, and the size of the financial system.
In terms of GDP per capita, the gap between Western Europe and the reform
states is still substantial (Table 1). Measured by its purchasing power, average
per-capita GDP of the three Visegrad countries amounts to less than two-thirds
of the per-capita GDP of the Southern member states of the EU, Greece and
Portugal. In terms of total population, the Visegrad countries are certainly less
attractive than, for example, Russia. Nevertheless, the growth potential of the
emerging financial markets is quite substantial. With the exception of the Czech
Republic, financial deepening - as measured by the ratio of the stock of money
(M2) over GDP - in the reform states is substantially lower than in the Western
European economies.
Another measure of (future) market volume is FDI in the nonfinancial
sector. Because the value of the stock of inward FDI relative to GDP varies
quite substantially across countries, comparisons between Eastern and Western
Europe are rather difficult. On average, the stock of FDI in the sub-sample of
transition economies has been about four percentage points lower than in the
group of Western European economies in 1994. Yet, this difference is mainly
driven by the inclusion of the United Kingdom with a stock of inward FDI of 49
percent of GDP. If the U.K. is excluded, the difference drops to less than one
percentage point. Much more remarkable is the difference between the flows of
FDI. In 1994, flows of FDI into the transition economies relative to GDP have
on average been more than twice as high as in the member states of the EU.
Despite the potential size of the Eastern European financial market, FDI
in the financial sector since the beginning of reforms
1
4 has accounted for a
relatively small share of total FDI if compared to Western economies (Table 2).
In Estonia, only 5.3 percent of FDI has flown into the financial sector, followed
1
4 The data cover the period 1989-95 for the Visegrad countries and the years
1993-95 for Estonia.21
by the Czech Republic and Poland with about 10 percent, and Hungary (19.5
percent). In contrast, over the course of the greater integration of financial mar-
kets in Western Europe between 1986 and 1992, Italy and Portugal attracted
about half of their inward FDI into the financial service sector.
2. Market Shares
Table 3 gives an overview of the structure of the banking systems by the
number of banks. Unfortunately, no detailed data on the number of foreign bank
representative offices, branches, and subsidiaries have been available for all
countries. In the Czech Republic, the number of joint ventures between domes-
tic and foreign banks has risen from 3 to 14 banks between 1991 and 1995. In
addition, there were 11 subsidiaries and 10 branches of foreign banks in opera-
tion in 1995. Overall, 64 percent of all banks in the Czech Republic had a for-
eign majority owner in 1995. In terms of total capital invested by foreigners in
the Czech banking system, EU banks dominated with a share of 58.3 percent in
1995 (1994: 57.5 percent). Slovak banks accounted for another 19.7 percent
(1994: 25.4 percent). In 1995, US banks have gained in importance, raising
their share from 4.4 to 12.3 percent of the foreign banks' capital (CNB, 1996b).
In Hungary, 50 percent of the banks have a foreign majority owner. In
both the Czech Republic and Hungary have foreigners also acquired minority
stakes in a quite substantial number of banks which might give them a control-
ling stake in the banks. The mere comparison of the number of banks with ma-
jority foreign owners may thus give a biased estimate of the actual role of for-
eigners in the corporate control of banks. Generally, banks with a majority for-
eign stake in Hungary have tripled in number since 1989 to 22 in 1995. In con-
trast to the Czech Republic, foreign banks in Hungary cannot open branches
(Botos, 1995).
The smallest number of foreign banks of the three Visegrad countries has
been present in Poland at the end of 1995 with 9 foreign-owned banks and 3
branches of foreign banks. In addition, 21 banks from abroad have established
representative offices in Poland (Wachtel, 1995). Foreign banks in Poland
mainly come from the United States, Germany, France, and Austria. In Estonia,
only 1 foreign bank branch but 7 representative offices were in operation in
April 1996.22
The mere number of foreign banks that is operating in a country provides
little information about the actual importance of their activities. Experience so
far has confirmed prior assumptions that foreign banks are likely to concentrate
on trade-related activities and wholesale banking. With a few exceptions, for-
eign banks have hardly expanded into the retail banking business in Central and
Eastern Europe (Wachtel, 1995).
The market shares of foreign banks in the countries under review differ
quite substantially (Tables 5-7).
1
5 Not always are these differences the result of
regulatory barriers to the market entry of foreign banks. Estonia, for example,
which has the most liberal regime towards foreign banks also has the smallest
share of foreign banks in total assets (2.9 percent in 1996). Obviously, the mod-
est size of the Estonian market is an impediment to greater foreign bank repre-
sentation.
Market size appears to be similar for the three Visegrad countries. While
the bigger size of the Polish market in terms of population should attract foreign
banks, FDI in the nonfmancial sector is relatively small as compared to the
Czech Republic or Hungary. Hence, in the Visegrad countries, differences in
foreign bank representation are more likely to be the result of licensing prac-
tices. Accordingly, the market share of foreign and joint venture banks in terms
of total assets is highest in Hungary (22.7 percent in 1995) which arguably has
the most liberal licensing regime, followed by the Czech Republic (15.9 per-
cent), and Poland (4.4 percent). Also in terms of total capital, foreign banks
were more important in Hungary (19.9 percent in 1995) and in the Czech Re-
public (13.9 percent) than in Poland (8.1 percent).
Generally, foreign banks find it easier to acquire market shares in the
credit market than in the deposit market, and they tend to focus their activities
on the wholesale banking business. This strategic choice is certainly influenced
by the lack of a country-wide branch network which a retail banking strategy
would require and which is rather costly to build up. The domestic banks and in
particular the traditional savings bank, in contrast, have access to a branch net-
work which eases the accumulation of household savings. Data for Poland show
in fact that the market shares of domestic banks are higher in the segment of de-
posits of natural persons (99.3 percent), who traditionally hold their accounts
1
5 When looking at the market shares of foreign banks, only those banks are
considered in which the foreign owner has a majority stake.23
with the savings banks, as compared to total deposits (91.9 percent). At the
same time, foreign banks can be considered to have superior loan assessment
skills than the domestic banks and may thus find it easier to compete on the
market for loans. Notwithstanding the importance of inherited bad loans, for-
eign banks in Poland also have a much smaller share of lost loans in total loans
(2 percent vs. 13 percent for the domestic banks) while the share of classified
credits tends to converge to roughly 20 percent (Table 7).
3. Balance Sheet Structure
With respect to their balance sheet structure, domestic and foreign banks
in Hungary display some important differences (Table 8). As regards their as-
sets, domestic banks tend to hold more cash and long-term securities than for-
eign banks. Partly, the high share of investments in long-term securities reflects
the fact that the domestic banks received consolidation bonds recapitalize them
for their (inherited) bad debt. To a substantial degree, however, domestic banks
also try to restructure their balance sheet towards safe and liquid investments,
hereby reducing their exposure to risky clients. Accordingly, the share of ac-
counts receivables and thus of loans to customers in total assets is greater for
the foreign banks (74.8 percent in 1994) than for domestic banks (56.2 percent).
As far as the structure of loans to customers is concerned, long-term loans are
much more important for the domestic banks (43.2 percent of loans to custom-
ers) than for the foreign banks (21 percent). This difference reflects both a
greater share of inherited long-term assets and a greater caution of the foreign
banks towards longer-term commitments. Because of their inherited bad loans,
domestic banks held more than 6 percent of their assets in loan loss provisions,
as opposed to less than 2 percent for the foreign banks. The major difference
between the two groups of banks as far as their liabilities are concerned is the
greater reliance of the foreign banks on the interbank market, i.e., on liabilities
to other banks, as a source of finance. Not very surprisingly, fully or partially
foreign-owned banks in Hungary tend to be better capitalized than domesti-
cally-owned banks. Between 1991 and 1994, foreign banks held equity at the
amount of 14.5 percent of total assets on average, domestic banks only at 7 per-
cent.
These trends in the structure of assets and liabilities are not a unique fea-
ture of the Hungarian banking system. Also in Poland did foreign banks invest
a larger share (41.5 percent) of their assets into loans to customers than the do-24
mestic banks (33.7 percent), and have investments into securities been less im-
portant for the foreign banks (21.1 versus 31.8 percent).
1
6 Also, the share of
capital in total assets for foreign banks in Poland (15.3 percent) has been almost
twice as high as for the domestic banks (8.3 percent). In the Czech Republic, the
reliance of foreign banks on the interbank market is greater than for the domes-
tic banks which primarily refinance themselves through deposits (CNB, 1995).
4. Profitability
While foreign banks are typically considered to be more efficient and
profitable in their operations than the domestic banks in Central and Eastern
Europe, little consistent data on the sources and uses on bank income that allow
a distinction between the two groups of banks are available. The data which are
being published by the Hungarian State Banking Supervision is an exception to
this rule. Although any data on the balance sheets and income statements of
banks in Central and Eastern Europe must be interpreted with substantial cau-
tion because of the lack of reliable accounting data and the gradual adoption of
accounting standards to Western levels, the available evidence allows some
conclusions to be drawn.
Table 9 shows that there has generally been a convergence between do-
mestic and foreign banks with respect to gross income generated out of banks'
assets. While gross income margins relative to total assets of domestic banks
had been 2-3 percentage points below those of foreign banks in 1992-1993,
these margins converged to a level of about 8 percent in 1994. Gross income
relative to total equity, in contrast, was much higher for the domestic banks be-
cause of their lower equity share in total assets. With regard to the sources of
income, (net) non-interest income was in 1992 and 1993 more important for the
foreign banks with about 40 percent of total income as opposed to 20-25 per-
cent for the domestic banks. Because only net data are reported, this may reflect
different areas of specialization as well as differences in investments into new
technology.
The most significant difference between domestic and foreign banks is
with respect to costs which have consistently been higher for the domestic
banks. In particular in 1993 when the banks made provisions for their bad assets
1
6 Data as of 1995 have been calculated from Olechowska (1996, p. 12).25
at the amount of 9.1 percent of their assets or 91.9 percent of their equity, total
costs have been twice as high in the domestic banks as in the foreign banks.
Operating costs of the domestic banks were also higher than for the foreign
banks throughout the sample period. As a consequence of lower income and
higher costs, the domestic banks' return on assets was lower than that of for-
eign-owned banks. While real return on equity (ROE) already turned positive in
the foreign banks in 1993 or 1994, depending on which price index is used, do-
mestic banks achieved a positive real ROE only on the basis of producer prices
in 1994. Again, data from Poland confirm this trend (Table 7). Here, return on
assets has been higher for the foreign than for domestic banks in 1994-95. Yet,
because of their lower share of capital relative to total assets, the domestic




Liberalizing the market access of foreign banks allows the production of
financial services according to comparative advantage, it fosters competition, it
may promote bank privatization, and it facilitates a transfer of know-how into
the emerging financial systems. In order to reap these benefits, most Central
European reform states had adopted a relatively liberal attitude towards the
market entry of foreign banks at the beginning of the reform process. Yet, as re-
forms continued and as non-performing loans started to threaten the viability of
the traditional domestic banks, this liberal stance has been replaced by a more
cautious approach, and quantitative restrictions on new banking licenses have at
least temporarily been introduced. In the meantime, these restrictions have been
relaxed somewhat, and the domestic banks have been recapitalized for most of
their inherited bad loans. In addition, banking regulations have gradually been
adjusted to Western standards, and banking supervision has been tightened.
Entering the second stage of banking reforms, those countries which are
already associated with the EU have to consider the full implementation of the
acquis communautaire, i.e., among others the full implementation of free trade
in financial services. Currently, FDI in banking in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe is still subject to a number of explicit and implicit entry barriers.
1
7 Note, however, that due to the higher share of bad loans in total loans for the
domestic banks, equity values may still be overstated.26
Because of the reform progress that has already been made, abolishing entry
barriers and allowing for home country control of foreign banks is unlikely to
put the overall stability of Ihe banking systems in the countries under review at
risk. Yet, it would allow exploiting the benefits of open markets.
The empirical analysis of this paper has shown that foreign banks have al-
ready made substantial inroads into the more advanced reform states. While the
growth in the number of foreign banks is thus likely to slow down, foreign
banks can still play a fruitful role in the privatization of domestic banks, in the
consolidation of the banking systems, and in the deepening of financial market
reforms. At the same time, the analysis does not support unrestricted market ac-
cess for all foreign banks. Due to asymmetries of information that prevail in fi-
nancial markets, a case can been made for some basic prudential regulation and
supervision (Dewatripont/Tirole, 1994). The transition economies may thus be
selective and allow unrestricted market access only to those banks that come
from countries where compliance with international banking standards can be
guaranteed by the home country banking supervision.
Many other reform states, notably most successor states of the former
Soviet Union, may find it useful to study the experience of Central Europe with
the market entry of foreign banks. The current structure and specialization pro-
files of foreign banks confirm the view that trade in goods, FDI in the nonfi-
nancial sector, and the market entry of foreign banks are complements. Foreign
banks tend to follow their corporate clients abroad, and they tend to focus their
activities on relatively small market niches. Liberalizing the market entry of
foreign banks can thus have positive spill-over effects for other reform areas.
The most important sequencing issue that arose from this paper is that the in-
cumbent banks should have received some compensation for their truly inher-
ited bad loans before markets are opened up for foreign banks. Because the
market entry of foreign banks can actually help to prevent new bad loans from
emerging, there is no case for restricting market entry after recapitalization has
taken place. Quite to the contrary, foreign banks can contribute to improved ef-
ficiency in banking as a prerequisite for a lasting stability of the banking sys-
tems in the transition economies.27
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End of period. — Classification according to the ownership status of the majority share-
holders. — a) Excluding building associations and banks under conservatorship. — b) 100
percent foreign-owned. — c) 1995 = April 1996. — d) Including specialized financial insti-
tutions. — e) Including privatized banks.
Sources: CNB (1996b); Eesti Pank a (1993, 1994); Eesti Pank b (1993:1,
1996:3); Groszek (1995, p. 6); NBH (1991); Polanski (1994); SBS
(1993); Wachtel (1995).30
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Table 5 — Market Shares in Hungary by Banking Groups, 1991-1995.
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a) Credits and deposits of the nonfinancial


















Source: Olechowska (1996, p. 12).34










































































































Liabilities 86.9 89.7 91.7 90.5 I 80.6 79.4 85.7 86.7
of which I
Current liabilities 68.6 72.6 74.5 72.1 | 75.7 73.1 76.9 73.2
Banks 17.3 10.8 11.3 10.41 35.4 19.6 21.3 25.0
Customers 42.3 52.6 53.6 53.7 I 36.3 49.6 50.1 44.7
Long-term li- 18.4 17.1 17.2 18.4 j 4.9 6.3 8.8 13.5
abilities I
Provisions 2.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 j 1.2 1.8 0.4 0.4
Equity 8.1 7.4 5.6 6.91 15.5 17.6 13.1 11.6
of which j
Registered capital 5.6 5.5 9.8 9.71 11.6 12.1 8.9 8.0
Profit 0.6 -0.4 -6.0 -0.2! 1.7 0.8 -0.1 0.5
Data do not add up to 100 percent because deferred assets and liabilities have been omitted.
Source: Unpublished data of the National Bank of Hungary; internal docu-
ments of the IfW; SBS (1995).35



































































































































































































































a) Detailed information about provisioning expenditures for 1991-1992 has not been avail-
able. These may be included in total costs and are therefore understated. From 1993 on, ac-
cording to Hungarian accounting standards, provisions are identical to the item "other ex-
penses" which includes other losses as well. — b) Real variables based on average price
changes during the period.
Sources: Vittas/Neal (1992); 1991-1992: internal documents of the IfW; 1993-
1994 (all banks): unpublished material of the National Bank of Hun-
gary; 1993-1994 (foreign and JV banks): SBS (1994a, 1995).36
List of References
BALTENSPERGER, Ernst, and Hellmuth MILDE (1987), Theorie des
Bankverhaltens, Berlin.
BISAT, Amer R., Barry JOHNSTON, and V. SUNDARARAJAN (1992), Issues
in Managing and Sequencing Financial Sector Reforms - Lessons from
Experiences in Five Developing Countries, International Monetary Fund,
Working Paper, No. 92/82, Washington D.C.
BLEJER, Mario, and Silvia SAGARI (1987), The Structure of the Banking
System and the Sequence of Financial Liberalisation, in: CONNOLLY,
M., and C. GONZALEZ (eds.), Economic Reforms and Stabilization in
Latin America, New York, 93-107.
BOTOS, Katalin (1995), The State of the Hungarian Banking System, Paper
presented at the conference on "The Role of the Banking System in the
Economic Transformation of Central European Countries", Polish Eco-
nomic Society, May 18-20, Warsaw.
BUCH, Claudia M. (1996), Creating Efficient Banking Systems - Theory and
Evidence from Eastern Europe, Kiel Institute of World Economics, Kiel
Studies, No. 277, Tubingen, forthcoming.
BUSCHGEN, Hans E. (1991), Bankbetriebslehre - Bankgeschaft und Bank-
management, 3rd edition, Wiesbaden.
BURY, Andrzej, et al. (1995), The Financial System in Poland 1994-1995,
Warsaw.
CHO, Yoon-Je, and Deena KHATKHATE (1989), Lessons of Financial Liber-
alization in Asia - A Comparative Study, The World Bank, Discussion
Paper, No. 50, Washington D.C.
CZECH NATIONAL BANK (CNBa), Indicators of Monetary and Economic
Developments in the Czech Republic (monthly), various issues, Prague.
— (CNBb), Vybrane Ukazatele Menoveho Vyvoje Ceske" Republiky (Selected
Indicators of Monetary Development in the Czech Republic), various is-
sues, Prague.
— (CNBc), Annual Report, various issues, Prague.
— (1995), Devisengesetz, Nr. 219/1995 der Gesetzessammlung vom 26. Sep-
tember 1995, Prague.
— (1996a), Report on the Monetary Development in the Czech Republic for the
First Quarter of 1996, Prague.37
— (1996b), Banking Supervision in the Czech Republic, Prague.
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1996), Kapitalverflechtungen mit dem Ausland,
Statistische Sonderveroffentlichung, No. 10, May, Frankfurt a.M.
DEWATRIPONT, Mathias, and Jean TIROLE (1994), The Prudential Regula-
tion of Banks, Cambridge.
EDWARDS, Sebastian, and Sweder VAN WIJNBERGEN (1987), On the Ap-
propriate Timing and Sequencing of Economic Liberalization in Develop-
ing Countries, in: CONNOLLY, M, and C. GONZALEZ (eds.), Eco-
nomic Reforms and Stabilization in Latin America, New York, 71-91.
EESTI PANK (1994), Law on Credit Institutions (adopted December 15, 1994),
unauthorized translation, Tallinn.
— (a), Annual Report, various issues, Tallinn.
— (b), Bulletin, various issues, Tallinn.
— (c), Statistical Datasheets, various issues, Tallinn.
von FURSTENBERG, George M., and Birgit HOFER (1996), Financial Inte-
gration in North America and Europe, Paper presented at the conference
,,Which Way Ahead for European Financial Markets - The German or the
Anglo-Saxon Model" of the American Institute for Contemporary Ger-
man Studies, 10.-11. June 1996, Washington D.C.
GELB, Alan H., and Silvia B. SAGARI (1990), Banking, in: MESSERLIN,
Patrick A., and Karl P. SAUVANT (eds.), The Uruguay Round - Services
in the World Economy, Washington D.C, 49-59.
GOLDBERG, Lawrence G., and Denise JOHNSON (1990), The determinants
of US banking activity abroad, Journal of International Money and Fi-
nance, Vol. 9, No. 2, 123-137.
GROSZEK, Mieczyslaw (1995), Role of Banks in Financing of Economic De-
velopment, Paper presented at the conference on "The Role of the Bank-
ing System in the Economic Transformation of Central European Coun-
tries", Polish Economic Society, May 18-20, Warsaw.
GRUBEL, Herbert G. (1977), A Theory of Multinational Banking, Banca Nazi-
onale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 123, 349-363.
HANDELSBLATT (1996), Liberalisierung des Kapitalverkehrs, 14.2.1996,
Dusseldorf.
HEINKEL, Robert L., and Maurice D. LEVI (1992), The structure of interna-
tional banking, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 11,
No. 3, 251-272.38
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) (1996), International Financial
Statistics (CD-Rom), Washington D.C.
KINDLEBERGER, Charles P. (1983), International Banks as Leaders or Fol-
lowers of International Business - A Historical Perspective, Journal of
Banking and Finance, Vol. 7, No. 4, 583-595.
KOMMISSION DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN (EU) (1993a),
Europa-Abkommen zur Griindung einer Assoziation zwischen den Eu-
ropaischen Gemeinschaften und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der
Republik Ungarn andererseits, Amtsblatt der Europaischen Gemein-
schaften, L 347, 31.12.1993, Brussels, 1-33.
— (1993b), Europa-Abkommen zur Griindung einer Assoziation zwischen den
Europaischen Gemeinschaften und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und
der Republik Polen andererseits, Amtsblatt der Europaischen Gemein-
schaften, L 348, 31.12.1993, Brussels, 1-32.
— (1994), BeschluB des Rates und der Kommission vom 19. Dezember 1994
iiber den AbschluB des Europa-Abkommen zwischen den Europaischen
Gemeinschaften und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der
Tschechischen Republik andererseits, Amtsblatt der Europaischen Ge-
meinschaften, L 360, 31.12.1994, Brussels, 1-34.
— (1995a), WeiBbuch - Vorbereitung der Assoziierten Staaten Mittel- und
Osteuropas auf die Integration in den Binnenmarkt der Union (Annexe),
KOM(95) 163 endg./2, Brussels.
— (1995b), Vorschlag fur einen BeschluB des Rates und der Kommission iiber
den AbschluB des Europa-Abkommens zwischen den Europaischen Ge-
meinschaften und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Republik Est-
land andererseits, KOM(95) 207 endg., 02.06.1995, Brussels.
KOSTRO, Edward (1992), Prawo Bankowe, Biblioteka Menedzera Bankowca,
Warsaw.
KUSCHEL, Hans-Dieter (1992), Die Europaabkommen der EG mit Polen, Un-
garn und der CSFR, Wirtschaftsdienst, 1992/11, 93-100.
LAINELA, Seija (1994), Private Sector Development and Its Prerequisites in
the Baltic Countries, Paper presented at the 3rd EACES Conference
"Transformation of Economic Systems", 8-10 September 1994, Budapest.
LAL, Deepak (1987), The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization, The
World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 273-299.39
MATHIESON, Donald J. (1980), Financial Reform and Stabilization Policy in a
Developing Economy, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 7, No. 3,
359-395.
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, and NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
(MOF/NBH) (1995), Financial Sector and Monetary Policy in Hungary,
mimeo, Budapest.
NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY (NBH) (1991), Monthly Report, Septem-
ber, Budapest.
— (1995), Law on Foreign Exchange, Unofficial translation, Budapest.
— (1994), Annual Report, Eves Jelentes, Budapest.
NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG (NZZ) (1996), Prag offnet den Bankensektor,
25.5.1996, Zurich.
OLECHOWSKA, Krystyna (1996), Partner czy straszak - Banki zagraniczne w
Polsce, Bank - Miesiecznik finansowo-bankowy, Vol. 43, No. 4, 9-12.
OLSOVSKY, Rudolf (1995), External Economic Relations of the Czech Re-
public in 1994, Economic Policy, No. 5, 7-8.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT (OECD) (1994a), OECD Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment -
Portugal, Paris.
— (1994b), OECD Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment - Greece , Paris.
— (1994c), OECD Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment - Italy , Paris.
PAWLOWICZ, Leszek (ed.) (1995), Restrukturyzacja Finansowa Przedsie-
biorstw i Bankow - II Raport z Badan, The Gdansk Academy of Banking,
Gdansk, mimeo.
PLANECON (1995), Commercial Banks in Poland: Who's Best?, Vol. 10,
No. 46-47, 31.1.1995, Washington D.C.
POLANSKI, Zbigniew (1994), Building a Monetary Economy in Poland in the
1990s, National Bank of Poland, Research Department, Working Paper,
No. 9, May, Warsaw.
REISEN, Helmut, und Bernhard FISCHER (1993), Financial Opening - Policy
Issues and Experiences of Developing Countries, OECD, Paris.
SAGARI, Silvia B. (1992), United States foreign direct investment in the
banking industry, Transnational Corporations, Vol. 1, No. 3, 93-123.
SELTEN, Reinhard (1980), Oligopoltheorie, in: FISCHER, Gustav (ed.),
Handworterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Stuttgart, 667-677.40
SOBOL, Dorothy Meadow (1995), Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Mar-
kets and Private Capital Flows, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
mimeo.
STATE BANKING SUPERVISION (SBS) (1993), Annual Report 1992, Buda-
pest.
— (1994a), Annual Report 1993, Budapest.
— (1994b), Amended Banking Act in Hungary, Budapest.
— (1995), Annual Report 1994-95, Budapest.
STIGLITZ, Joseph E., and Andrew WEISS (1981), Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 1,
393-410.
TIROLE, Jean (1994), Western prudential regulation: assessment, and reflection
on its application to Central and Eastern Europe, Economics of Transi-
tion, Vol. 2, No. 2, 129-150.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD) (1994a), Trade and Development Report, 1994, New York
and Geneva.
— (1994b), The outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment, Sup-
porting Papers to the Trade and Development Report, 1994, New York
and Geneva.
— (1995), World Investment Report 1995 - Transnational Corporations and
Competitiveness, New York and Geneva.
VITTAS, Dimitri and Craig NEAL (1992), Competition and Efficiency in Hun-
garian Banking, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, No.
1010, October, Washington D.C.
WACHTEL, Paul (1995), Foreign Banking in the Central European Economics
in Transition, Issue Paper for the Institute for EastWest Studies, New
York.
WALTER, Ingo (1985), Barriers to Trade in Banking and Financial Services,
Trade Policy Research Centre, Thames Essay, No. 41, London.
THE WORLD BANK (1996a), Global Economic Prospects and the Developing
Countries, Washington D.C.
— (1996b), World Development Report 1996 - From Plan to Market, Washing-
ton D.C.